Introduction
, following Grosz and Sidner [1986:201] point to the possibility that interpreters can often infer intentional relations fi'om informational relations, and vice versa. I originally intended to explore the nn.ture of these inferences in the framework of SDRT and DICE, and show how they go through in some cases, but not in others) The details of this modelling turn out to be interesting, 1)ut not wholely surprising. I will theretbre take the inference-based model for granted, and pose instea.d two rhetorical qttesl.ions that arose whelL working it out. The questions are: first, when is an intentionM relation not a.n intentional r(da.tion? And secondly, when is an inforinational relation not an ilfforma,tional rela, tion? 2 A question of intention (1) Nobody seems to ca.re al)ont any modern poet nowadays except . Which relations hold between the elements of (2)? If we are interested ill tile domain of time and causality, the informationM relations are easy enough: the eventuality of (2a,) temporally overlaps with those of both (21)) and (2c); (2b)'s event temporally succeeds (2c)'s, a.nd is caused by it. But which intentionM relations hohl between thenV, t
In Lascarides and Oberlander [1993] , we analysed the l)resuppositiomd beha.vi()ur of temporal connectives like after, and proposed a. model ill which subordinate cla.us(,s like (2(:) a.re accomntodated via discourse attachment. As usual, various defeasil)le inferences go through, aad the conclusion is that the following discourse relations hold between the SDR.Ss: Backg, vund(2a., 2c) , Narlution(2c, 2b), and Result(2c, 2b) . Notice: the inference process delivers not one hut l',,o discourse relations holding between (21)) and (2c). So it, seems tha.t we have gone a. step further than Moore and Pollack: we not only agree with their Mullih'vrl cla.im; we a,lso go on to make a, Multirchttion cla,im: more than one intentiona.l-level r(,la, ti(m ca.n simulta.neously hohl Imtween l.w(~ discourse segments.
In response, one could invent a new discourse relation, Narratiou'n'Rt'.~ull, which wouhl hohl in just these cases. But its tack of independent motiva.tion, a.nd its resemblance to Knott ~rn(I Dale's [1992:7] inform-accidcnt-and-mcntion-fi'uit rela.tion is undermining. Alteruately, one could argue that the multiplicity of discourse relations arises because we alrea.dy have too many intentional relations, rather than too few. On this account, we should dipose of (sa.y) Result, and make do with the intentionM relation Narration, and various informational rela.tions, like cause, to cover the cases. There is something to be said for this view, but I won't say it here.
Rather, I would defend the Multirela.tion cla.im by observing that it is the ua.tural concomita.nt of the multiple intentions served by single segments of discourse. We entertain as welt as describe; impress as well as convince. Grosz and Sidner [198{i: 178] 1)oint out that the a,ssumption that each segment has but one purpose will "in the end prove too strong". So segments serve multil)le orthogonal goals; and this means that a. segment ma.y Ih.ll into multiple rela.tionships, (,v(,n with a single other segment.
Thus, it shouhl be no surl)rise tha.t a. discourse sl.ru(:tllre tlmoi'y can (hdiver m.r~, tha.n one intentiona.l relation holding between two discourse segments. Indeed, on this stt~ry, it. is much more surprising that some theories do not.
(4)
This may seem to carry the iml)lication that the knowledge ill question is a.cquired without observation. The fact, if it be a t'a.ct, that I take lol,ger steps left l'oot forward wouhl not ]lave any bearing ()n the ca.t'e with which I might illvestiga.te the ma.tter; l might make my measurements carelessly and gel; the wrong answer. But where I intend something it seems to be guaranteed tha.t I couh[ not get a wrong answer, so it seems as though we nmst know our own intentions independently of obserw~.ti(m. a. But where I intend something b. it seems to be guaranteed that I could not get a wrong answer, c. so it seems as though we must know our own intentions iztdependently of ohservation.
Which intentionM rela.tions hold between (41) (41)) and (4c) was the directive part (of'. Elhadad [1992:204] , who adapting Halli(lay, distinguishes between directive and subordinate segments). Thus, even with exactly the same causal structure beneath it, the argument could be inverted: we could be mentionillg (4c) to l)rovide evidence for (41)), rather than vice versa.. But 'when wollld th(~ argument be iHverted? In Grosz ~md Sidner [1986:201] , there is an equivalence between the intbrmational relati(m supports and the intentional rel;ttion Dominates. Under DICE's inference regime, the flip I)etwe(m (,'on.~cquencc and Evidence tracks the flip in the direction of supports.
But how can a doma.in rela.tion like supports "change direction"? We agree that it's "not iml)lication"; but it's not even just defeasiblt: intplication. It's like implicatioll, in that it concerns transfer of degrees of belief; but unlike most implications, there need 1)e nothing "out there" to make one direction right, and the other wrong. A spea.ker and hearer may di[:l'er as to whether p causes q or vice versa. Only one of them will he right on each occasion. But if they dift'er as to whether p supports q, they can both be right; it just depends on their individual networks of prior beliefs. And if this is so, supports is not an informatio~,a.l---(lomain---rela.tiol. (:m a pa.r with causes. If it is a (lomMn relation, a theory of discourse structure must esta.I)lish whi,'h doma.in it's a relation on. 5 References
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